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INTRODUCTION 
Various models exist suggesting why persistently high initial returns for new issue offerings are not inconsistent 
with efficient markets (Rock (1986), Tinic (1988), Welch (1989), among others).  In addition, considerable work has 
also been done investigating both intermediate (one to six months) and long-term (one to five years) aftermarket and 
operating performance of these issues, including research by Ritter (1991), Ritter and Loughran (1995), Jain and 
Kini (1994), and Rajan and Servaes (1997).  These studies show that in the years following an IPO, a company’s 
stock returns tend to perform worse than a control group.  While these studies provide some time series results, the 
majority of the results are of samples aggregated across the sample period.  To date, work remains incomplete to 
determine if systematic changes in investor behavior is evident over time, or, in Ritter’s words, whether “Bayesian 
investors  . . . adequately revise their estimates.”  This paper extends the data sets of previous work and examines the 
time series data to see if investors appear to learn.  By learn we mean gain knowledge and understanding through 
experience.  Any actual learning should be reflected in future changes in behavior.  We may expect that when faced 
with continual poor performance after the initial offering that investors may learn from their mistakes and change 
their behavior.  Surprisingly, we find that investors’ aggregate behavior does not seem to change over time.  Tables 1 
through 5 reveal no clear trend or changing pattern.  After the initial price increase following the IPO, stock returns 
are on average negative over the next three years.  This is true even for the most recent time periods. 
Additionally, in an extension of Ragan and Servaes (1997), the evolution of analyst earnings forecasts is also 
followed over an extended sample period.  We examine whether analysts are able to learn and to change their 
behavior over time.  If analysts historically tend to be overly optimistic in their forecasts, we might expect that they 
will learn from their mistakes and make more accurate forecasts.   
We find that the percentage of IPOs that analysts follow has increased dramatically over the past decade.  We 
also find that those IPOs that are followed by analysts during the first year substantially outperform the IPOs that 
analysts do not follow.  In eight of the first ten years of the study period, however, the returns for the stocks that were 
initially followed by analysts are negative in the second and third year following the IPO.  Some learning by analysts, 
however, does appear to occur.  Analysts have recently been more successful at selecting IPOs that perform well.  
Since 1991, the performance in years two and three of the IPOs followed by analysts was positive each year.  This is 
true even though the analysts followed a larger percentage of IPOs since 1991. 
Section I describes the data used in this study.  Section II describes how we measure the aftermarket 
performance and how we select a control sample.  Section III contains results on investor behavior over time and 
section IV contains results on analyst behavior over time.  Section V contains concluding remarks. 
THE DATA 
The data were obtained from two sources.  Jay Ritter generously provided the sample from his 1991 Journal of 
Finance paper which includes 1526 IPOs offered between 1975 and 1984.1  Additional IPOs were obtained from the 
Securities Data Corporation New Issues database (SDC).  IPOs from this source have an SDC-reported offer date 
between January 1, 1975 and December 31, 1995.  To be consistent, selection criteria for IPOs from this source closely 
follow Loughran and Ritter (95) and are as follows:  (1), the offer price must be $1.00 per share or more, (2) the offering 
must be of common stock only, (3), the company must appear on the CRSP NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ daily tape within 
six months of its SDC-reported offer date, and (4) the gross proceeds from the sale must be at least $1,000,000. Using 
these criteria, 3,846 additional firms were obtained from the SDC database.  The total data set includes 5,370 IPOs. 
Table 1 presents basic distribution information concerning the entire sample. Over the entire sample period, 
there is no clear trend in the distribution of the number of offerings each year, except for two general observations.  
The first observation is that there was little activity during the first five years of the sample period.  While this period 
represents nearly 23% of the time period examined, less than 3% of the total number of IPOs in the sample were 
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offered (0.6% of total offers when measured by size.)  The second observation which can be made is that the cyclical 
nature of IPO activity does appear to be continuing through the most recent years of the sample period, a finding not 
previously reported.  In six of the first eight years of the sample period, where changes from the previous year can be 
calculated (1976 - 1983), more IPOs came to the market than in the previous year. 2  Over the next seven years (1984 
- 1990), the environment for IPOs apparently became less favorable.  In six of these seven years, the number of 
offerings decreased from the year before.  Finally, in five of the last six years of the sample period (1991 - 1996), 
increases in IPO offerings relative to the previous year are again observed. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Data Set 
 
Panel A: Annual and Full Sample Statistics     
  Offering Size Percent of 
 Number Largest Median Mean All Offerings 
Year of IPOs ($ millions) ($ millions) ($ millions) By Size 
1975 12 127.1 11.1 21.9 0.1% 
1976 31 32.0 5.5 7.6 0.1% 
1977 22 36.0 4.0 6.3 0.1% 
1978 31 26.0 5.3 7.0 0.1% 
1979 60 21.6 6.2 6.5 0.2% 
1980 132 109.1 4.9 8.9 0.6% 
1981 312 120.1 5.2 9.2 1.5% 
1982 96 98.8 5.2 12.9 0.6% 
1983 603 340.3 10.5 20.4 6.3% 
1984 280 131.6 6.0 11.2 1.6% 
1985 206 748.8 10.0 23.2 2.4% 
1986 422 100.0 12.2 32.6 7.0% 
1987 341 850.0 14.4 42.0 7.3% 
1988 184 673.1 21.4 73.9 7.0% 
1989 157 958.3 26.2 74.2 6.0% 
1990 136 600.0 30.0 57.9 4.0% 
1991 190 271.3 25.0 31.0 3.0% 
1992 269 189.8 24.1 30.4 4.2% 
1993 389 415.7 24.4 36.8 7.3% 
1994 310 237.6 20.0 28.9 4.6% 
1995 467 880.0 32.4 56.1 13.4% 
1996 720 2147.5 33.2 61.2 22.5% 
Total 5370 2147.5 17.0 36.4 100.0% 
            
Panel B:  Average Annual Percentage Change   
  Number Largest Median Mean 
    of IPOs ($ millions) ($ millions) ($ millions) 
   --- 1976 - 1996 106.5% 183.6% 37.1% 47.1% 
   --- 1985 - 1996 44.8% 173.1% 25.7% 39.7% 
 
Less clear are discernable trends for either mean or median offering size across the sample period.  The 
strongest statements that can be made with regard to these descriptive measures are that (1), mean offering size for 
seven of the first eight years of the sample period is dramatically smaller than for the remaining years, and (2), 
median offering size is always less than mean offering size.  The skewed distribution is a logical result since the 
lower boundary for offering size is $1 million and there is no upper boundary. 
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One final result appears in Table 1.  Even in the face of general trends in the number of offers, there is persistent 
evidence that over the twenty-one year sample period, the IPO market is subject to very large variations in both the 
number and size of new issues offered from year to year.  Panel B provides the absolute value of the average annual 
percentage change in the number of IPOs per year, the largest IPO, the median IPO and the mean IPO.  Over the 
sample period, almost “wild” variations from year to year in number as well as size of offerings are present.  Even 
for the period from 1985 through 1996 when the number of initial public offerings is consistently above two hundred 
(the second row of Panel B), the change from the number of issues offered the previous year is on average nearly 
forty-five percent.  Furthermore, this dramatic fluctuation is also evident when examining the average annual 
absolute percentage change in offering size (173.1%), and to a lesser but still economically significant extent, when 
considering median and mean offering size (25.7% and 39.7%, respectively). 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of sample firms by industry based on two digit SIC codes appearing in the 
Compustat manual. 3  There is a large concentration of IPOs within a handful of industries.  While seventy-six industries 
are identified as having firms that underwent an IPO, fully 53.0% of all sample offerings occurred within just eight 
industries, and seventeen industries accounted for three-fourths of all offerings.  The top thirty industries accounted for 
88.1% of the entire sample IPOs, with the remaining 11.9% of offerings occurring in an additional forty-six industries. 
 
Table 2: The Thirty Industries with the Most IPOs between 1975 and 1996 
 
    Offering Size % of Total Cumulative
    Mean Median Offerings % of Total
  Industry Number ($ millions) ($ millions) (by Size) Offerings 
1  Business Services 686 28.6 20.3 10.0% 12.8%
2  Electric & Electric Equipment 445 26.3 13.5 6.0% 21.1%
3  Industrial, Comm'l & Computers 375 23.8 14.6 4.6% 28.0%
4  Measuring Instr., Photo, Watches 347 20.6 11.9 3.7% 34.5%
5  Holding Co.s, Other Investment Offices 331 120.0 66.0 20.3% 40.7%
6  Chemical & Allied Products 255 34.8 19.0 4.5% 45.4%
7  Depository Institutions 210 18.4 9.7 2.0% 49.3%
8  Health Services 196 24.3 15.8 2.4% 53.0%
9  Durable Goods--Wholesale 178 24.1 12.7 2.2% 56.3%
10  Oil & Gas Extraction 168 35.0 8.0 3.0% 59.4%
11  Communications 147 70.3 33.8 5.3% 62.2%
12  Eating & Drinking Places 134 15.4 9.0 1.1% 64.7%
13  Nondepository Credit Institutions 132 43.1 16.2 2.9% 67.1%
14  Engring, Acct, Mgmt & Related Services 121 22.4 16.0 1.4% 69.4%
15  Miscellaneous Retail 119 36.9 18.6 2.2% 71.6%
16  Nondurable Goods--Wholesale 95 32.4 14.5 1.6% 73.4%
17  Insurance Carriers 94 63.4 27.7 3.0% 75.1%
18  Transportation Equipment 73 45.5 18.3 1.7% 76.5%
19  Misc. Manufacturing Industries 70 21.5 15.2 0.8% 77.8%
20  Food & Kindred Products 67 51.5 13.2 1.8% 79.0%
21  Apparel & Accessory Stores 60 34.4 21.0 1.1% 81.2%
22  Elec, Gas & Sanitary Services 60 26.3 12.7 0.8% 80.1%
23  Fabr. Metal, except Mach, Trans Equip. 52 17.9 10.6 0.5% 82.2%
24  Primary Metal Industries 49 43.4 30.0 1.1% 83.1%
25  Motion Pictures 47 23.6 12.5 0.6% 85.8%
26  Motor Freight Transportation, Warehouses 47 22.7 17.0 0.5% 84.0%
27  Transportation by Air 47 18.5 12.6 0.4% 84.9%
28  Printing, Publishing & Related Areas 45 44.2 17.8 1.0% 86.6%
29  Security & Commodity Brokers 41 46.1 22.8 1.0% 87.4%
30  Amusement & Recreation Services 41 39.9 25.7 0.8% 88.1%
  All Others (46 others) 638 36.0 19.6 11.8% 100.0%
  Total 5370 36.4 17.0 100.0% 100.0%
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While the majority of industries’ median offering sizes are clustered between $10 million and $25 million, 
substantial differences do exist between certain industries.  Median (mean) offering size ranges from a low of  $8.0 
($35.0) million for the Oil and Gas Extraction industry (SIC code 13), to $66.0 ($120.0) million for firms classified 
as Holding Companies and Other Investment Offices (SIC code 67).  In fact, so large are the offerings in this 
particular industry, that the industry with the nearest median offering size, the Communications industry (SIC code 
48), has a median offering size of just slightly more than one-half that of largest industry, or $33.8 million ($70.3 
million mean).  Strangely, the Oil and Gas Extraction Industry also has the most disproportionate number of small 
firms, a result identified by Ritter (1984) as contributing significantly to what he termed the “hot issue” market of 
1980 [for IPOs]. 
Further evidence of size concentration among the identified industries is evident when comparing an industry’s 
aggregate dollar offerings relative to the total dollar offerings for the full sample.  Using this measure, the largest 
concentrations occur within the SIC classifications designated as Holding Companies and Other Investment Offices 
(20.3% of the total), Business Services (10.0%), Electrical and Electrical Equipment (6.0%), Communications 
(5.3%), and Industrial, Commercial and Computer Equipment (4.6%).  As a final comment regarding the information 
in Table 2, it should be noted that the industry concentration of offering size is surprisingly similar to the industry 
concentration of firm offerings.  The top five industries account for 46.2% of total dollar volume, and the cumulative 
total for the top ten, fifteen and thirty industries is 63.3%, 74.0%, and 88.2%, respectively. 
Table 3 presents for each year those three industries having the most offerings during the year, and again, there 
is some evidence of trends in initial public offerings.   Industrial, Commercial and Computer Equipment firms appear 
in the top three industries for ten of the first eleven years of the sample period, and twelve times overall.  The 
Business Services industry appears twelve times as well, and the Electrical, Except Computers industry (SIC code 
36) appears sixteen times in the top three.   
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THE MEASURES OF AFTERMARKET PERFORMANCE AND 
THE SELECTION OF CONTROL FIRMS 
To be consistent with earlier work, two measures of the aftermarket performance are used:  conventional 
cumulative benchmark-adjusted abnormal returns (CAR) and buy and hold returns.  The benchmark-adjusted CAR 
series appearing in this study are straightforward, utilizing daily portfolio rebalancing and benchmarks of the CRSP 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ value-weighted and equal-weighted indices, as well as returns for matched control firms. 4  
The benchmark-adjusted return for firm i on day t is calculated as: 
where, 
rit = the raw return for security i on event day t.  
rmt = the return for the benchmark m on event day t.  
 
Calculating the average benchmark-adjusted return yields 
The cumulated average benchmark-adjusted return is simply the summation of the daily average benchmark-adjusted 
returns 
The calculation of the buy and hold return is as equally straightforward. 
Ri = ( )1
1
756


 rit
t
 
where, 
Ri = the compound return for firm i through day t 
rit = raw return for security i on event day t . 
This equation measures the individual holding period return for the sample and control firms through any period.  
Consistent with Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995), as well as others, the initial return is not included in 
the holding period return calculation; the holding period return begins with the return on the second day of trading 
reported by CRSP.  The individual buy and hold returns are then averaged, and a relative measure of the sample 
firms’ aftermarket performance is calculated by a wealth relative, defined as follows:  (i.e. for the three-year period) 
The interpretation of this ratio is direct.  If the wealth relative is greater than 1.00, the sample IPO firms 
outperformed the control firms.  If it is less than 1.00, the sample IPO firms underperformed the control firms. 
As with the calculation of the wealth relative, the criteria for selecting matched control firms also follows 
Loughran and Ritter (1995).  Potential control firms not issuing stock within the previous five years were ranked 
according to capitalization and that firm nearest in capitalization but larger than the sample firm was selected as the 
control.  If the control firm was delisted prior to the last trading date of the sample firm, the next largest potential 
control firm (measured at the time of the offering), became the new control firm.  In the event the control firm issued 
additional equity prior to the last trading date of the sample firm, a new, nonissuing control firm replaced the issuing 
firm on the old control firm’s offer date (again, using the size criteria described above.)  Matching firms by industry, 
is not done, so as to maintain consistency with Loughran and Ritter (1995). 5 
AFTERMARKET PERFORMANCE, ARE INVESTORS LEARNING? 
After the initial one-day positive return, the returns of IPOs have been shown to underperform control samples 
[See Ritter (1991) and Ritter and Loughran (1995)].  It appears that investors are overly optimistic at the offering 
and bid up the price of the stock “too high”.  Then in the following years, when reality sets in, the stock 
underperforms the market and the stock price is set at a more realistic level.  Rational investors observing this past 
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trend in prices may be expected to change their behavior.  The investors could cease to bid up the price of the initial 
offering by such large amount and the result could be a better performance of returns over the following years. 
In table 4, we examine whether investors appear to be “learning “ over time.  One indication of learning would 
be if the wealth relatives in year 1, 2 and 3  would cease to decline or begin to decline by smaller amounts in more 
recent years.  If the wealth relatives stay below 1.0 over time we can conclude that “learning” is not taking place. 
If analysis is confined to those years with at least 100 IPOs, the initial return ranged from a low of 5% in 1988 to 
a high of 39% in 1980. One discernable trend is that the initial return was less than 10% from 1984 through 1989, 
and above 10% from 1990 through the end of the sample period.  During the years when the number of IPOs was 
generally increasing (1978-1983 and 1991-1996) the initial return never average less than 10%.  During the years 
when the number of IPOs was declining (1984-1990) the initial return never averaged more than 10%.  Furthermore, 
it is not apparent that the initial return is directly related to the proportion of the firms having a positive initial return.   
 
Table 4: Aggregate Returns and Wealth Relatives by Year of Offering 
 
   Percent of Firms Whose Initial     
   Return is:  Wealth Relatives at End of: 
Year No. Initial Ret. Positive Negative Unchanged   Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
75 12 0.00    33.3 % 66.7% 0.0% 0.89 0.77 0.79
76 31 0.06   64.5 % 35.5% 0.0% 0.86 1.03 1.07
77 22 0.09   63.6 % 36.4% 0.0% 1.01 1.12 1.51
78 31 0.32    80.6%* 19.4% 0.0% 0.84 0.99 0.99
79 60 0.27    78.3%* 20.0% 1.7% 1.43 1.40 1.03
80 132 0.39 82.6%* 14.4% 3.0% 0.99 0.67 0.67
81 312 0.10 73.4%* 23.4% 3.2% 0.73 0.78 0.54
82 96 0.16 73.7%* 25.3% 1.1% 1.05 0.64 0.58
83 603 0.13 76.0%* 21.7% 2.3% 0.86 0.85 0.95
84 280 0.09 73.6%* 22.9% 3.6% 1.08 0.98 0.82
85 206 0.08 75.7%* 23.8% 0.5% 0.93 0.81 0.80
86 422 0.08 66.4%* 28.9% 4.7% 0.98 0.92 1.04
87 341 0.07 60.8%* 33.0% 6.2% 0.91 0.84 0.88
88 184 0.05 63.6%* 25.5% 10.9% 0.98 0.92 0.50
89 157 0.07 77.1%* 17.8% 5.1% 1.01 0.77 0.48
90 136 0.10 66.2%* 25.0% 8.8% 0.89 0.70 0.62
91 190 0.13 81.6%* 16.3% 2.1% 0.88 0.93 0.85
92 269 0.12 72.5%* 21.2% 6.3% 0.88 0.78 0.82
93 389 0.12 77.1%* 18.5% 4.4% 0.92 1.00 1.08
94 310 0.10 78.7%* 11.9% 9.4% 1.17 1.21 NA
95 467 0.20 82.4%* 14.3% 3.2% 1.05 NA NA
96 720 0.17 79.7%* 15.0% 5.3%  NA NA NA
Total 5370 0.13 74.6%* 20.9% 4.5%  0.96 0.89** 0.83*** 
 
 
 
  
If IPOs are ordinary events, we would expect that about 50% of the firms would have a positive initial one-day 
return.  Table 4 shows that 74.6% of all IPOs have a positive initial one-day return.  This is significantly different 
from 50%, at the .05 significance level, using a binomial test. 
Also, if IPOs are ordinary events we would expect their performance in years 1, 2 and 3 following the IPO to be 
approximately equal to that of the control firms.  This would result in wealth relatives close to 1.0.  In year 1 the 
wealth relative is 0.96 which shows that the IPOs have underperformed the control firms, but not by a statistically 
significant amount using a binomial test.  In years 2 and 3 following the IPO the wealth relatives are 0.89 and 0.83, 
respectively, which are significantly lower than 1.00 at the .05 and .01 levels, respectively.  The IPOs performance 
continues to deteriorate over the time period. 
Table 5 presents additional information on the performance of sample firms partitioned by offering year and 
whether the firm is actively trading at the end of each of the three years.  The results in this table are presented to 
An * in the percent positive column (column 4) indicates that the column's percentage is significantly different from 50.0% (the null) at the .05 
significance level using a binomial test.  The totals at the bottom of the wealth relative columns are significantly different from 1.0 (the null) at 
the .01 (**) or .005 (***) significance level as indicated.
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help determine if the performance results are driven by a small number of firms.  Again, there appears to be no 
relationship between the level of IPO activity for the year and either the number of firms actively trading over time 
or the performance of those firms.  Additionally, there seems to be no relationship between the prior year’s issuing 
activity and the direction of the aftermarket performance change for the following year.  However, there are a few 
general observations that can be made.  Most apparent is the high average number of firms still actively trading after 
one year, 97.8%.  Each subsequent year there is a reduction in firms trading, with an average of 89.8% and 79.9% of 
firms trading at the end of years 2 and 3, respectively.  For the full sample, at the end of each year slightly more than 
half of the firms (51.8%) have outperformed the matched control firm.  This suggests that the generally poor 
aftermarket performance of the aggregated IPO sample (aggregated either by year or across the full sample) is not 
characteristic of most firms.  More than half of the firms outperform their control firm but the ones that underperform 
their control firm do so by a larger margin.  Therefore, when the results are aggregated, the overall sample of IPOs 
underperforms the overall sample of controls.  As a final comment concerning Table 5, there appears to be no trend 
in firm performance over the sample period as measured by the percent of firms having a performance superior to 
that of the control in the years following the IPO.  After 2 years 51.0% have outperformed the matched control firm 
and after 3 years 50.5% have outperformed the matched control firm. 
The results in tables 4 and 5 seem to indicate that investors are not learning.  The poor performance of stock 
returns following an IPO has not diminished in recent years.  Even though this pattern has been occurring for years, 
investors have not altered their behavior.  These results favor the theory that the investors who are most enthusiastic 
about a particular stock offering bid up its initial price and then as more realistic scenarios unfold the stock price 
returns to a more appropriate level. 
 
Table 5: The Number of IPOs Offered by Year and the Percent of Firms Actively Trading 1, 2, and 3 Years 
from the Offer Date 
 
  Firms Active at End of Year 1 Firms Active at End of Year 2 Firms Active at End of Year 3 
  Percent of % with Wealth Rel. Percent of % with Wealth Rel. Percent of % with Wealth Rel.
Year No. IPOs Issued >1 <1 IPOs Issued >1 <1 IPOs Issued >1 <1
75 12 100.0% 41.7% 58.3% 83.3% 20.0%* 80.0% 83.3% 20.0%* 80.0%
76 31 100.0% 41.9% 58.1% 93.5% 65.5% 34.5% 87.1% 44.4% 55.6%
77 22 95.5% 61.9% 38.1% 77.3% 64.7% 35.3% 84.5% 20.0%* 13.3%
78 31 100.0% 51.6% 48.4% 90.3% 64.3% 35.7% 71.0% 72.7%* 27.3%
79 60 93.3% 64.3%* 35.7% 96.7% 72.4%* 27.6% 90.0% 55.6% 44.4%
80 132 98.5% 51.5% 48.5% 88.6% 41.0%* 59.0% 73.5% 45.4% 54.6%
81 312 96.2% 39.0%* 61.0% 88.8% 53.1% 46.9% 81.1% 31.6%* 68.4%
82 96 95.8% 59.8% 40.2% 89.6% 45.3% 54.7% 77.1% 45.9% 52.7%
83 603 98.0% 46.7% 53.3% 89.2% 47.8% 52.2% 77.4% 52.7% 47.3%
84 280 96.8% 59.0%* 41.0% 85.4% 54.8% 45.2% 71.4% 48.5% 51.5%
85 206 97.1% 52.5% 47.5% 86.4% 42.1%* 57.9% 73.8% 53.9% 46.1%
86 422 98.1% 53.6% 46.4% 89.1% 49.5% 50.5% 76.1% 54.8% 45.2%
87 341 94.4% 49.1% 50.9% 82.1% 48.2% 51.8% 73.3% 54.0% 45.6%
88 184 96.7% 44.9% 55.1% 89.7% 47.9% 52.1% 82.6% 45.4% 54.6%
89 157 98.7% 49.7% 50.3% 96.2% 49.0% 51.0% 87.3% 43.8% 56.2%
90 136 99.3% 42.2% 57.8% 95.6% 43.1% 56.9% 89.7% 41.8% 58.2%
91 190 100.0% 54.2% 45.8% 97.9% 54.8% 45.2% 88.4% 60.1%* 39.9%
92 269 99.3% 47.9% 52.1% 94.8% 49.0% 51.0% 80.3% 56.5% 43.5%
93 389 99.0% 51.4% 48.6% 90.0% 58.0%* 42.0% 84.3% 59.8%* 40.2%
94 310 99.0% 63.5%* 36.5% 92.6% 58.2%* 41.8% NA NA NA
95 467 98.5% 60.0%* 40.0% NA NA NA NA NA NA
96 720 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
  4650 97.8% 51.8%* 48.2% 89.8% 51.0% 49.0% 79.9% 50.5% 48.5%
 
 
 
An * indicates the percentage is statistically different from 50.0% (the null) at the .05 level. 
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THE CHANGING BEHAVIOR OF ANALYSTS, ARE THEY LEARNING? 
Section III shows that investors as a group do not appear to be learning and changing their behavior.  Is the 
behavior of analysts any different?  One could argue that analysts are a more sophisticated and better informed group 
and could perhaps be first to change their behavior based upon observations of the past. 
The IBES tapes show which firms are being followed by analysts and data are available from 1981 to 1996.  
Table 6 presents this IBES data merged with the IPO sample.  The percentage of newly listed firms followed by 
IBES has ranged from 8% in 1981 to 75% in 1995.  Table 6 also shows the performance of IPOs that were followed 
by analysts within one year of their offer date (panel A, at top) versus those IPOs that were not followed by analysts 
(panel B, at bottom).  It is immediately clear that the wealth relatives in years one, two and three are greater for those 
firms followed by analysts than for those not followed by analysts.  A Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank test 
(Siegel, 1956, pp. 75-83) was used to determine if the wealth relatives at the end of each year in panel A are 
statistically larger than the wealth relatives in panel B.  For each of the three years the wealth relatives are 
significantly larger in panel A than in panel B at the .01 significance level.6  It appears that analysts are quite adept at 
selecting IPOs to follow. 
Previous research has suggested that firms that have less information available about them tend to earn higher 
returns.  One of the earlier studies in this area, Barry and Brown (1984), used the time that a stock has been listed as 
a proxy for the availability of information.  Newly listed firms have less information available about them causing 
investors to demand higher returns for these firms.  Our study examines IPOs which, by definition, have not listed at 
all, and consequently have even less information available about them.  Our results suggest that when the period of 
time a stock has been listed is near zero, investors feel more comfortable investing in stocks that analysts have 
chosen to follow.  The evidence of this is the higher wealth relatives in panel A as compared to panel B.  The 
information provided by the analysts about these new firms may in fact help their performance. 
For the time period 1981-1990, however, the returns in years two and three are negative.  This can be seen by 
observing the declining wealth relatives in years two and three.  The general decline in wealth relatives in years two 
and three occur in both the IPOs that are followed by the analysts and those not followed by the analysts.  During this 
ten year period, for the IPOs appearing on IBES (in panel A), the wealth relatives decline from year 1 to year 2 in 8 
of the 10 years (the exceptions are years 1981 and 1986.)  The wealth relatives also decline from year 1 to year 3 in 8 
of the 10 years (the exceptions are years 1986 and 1987.)  During the same ten-year period, for IPOs not appearing 
on IBES (in panel B), the wealth relatives also decline from year 1 to year 2 in 8 of the 10 years (exceptions are 
years 1981 and 1983.)  They also decline form year 1 to year 3 in 8 of 10 years (exceptions are years 1983 and 
1986.)  So the declines in wealth relatives are substantial and similar among both IPOs appearing on IBES and those 
not appearing on IBES. 
In Contrast, after 1990 the wealth relatives of the IBES IPO group increase in every year from year 1 to year 2 
and in every year from year 1 to year 3.  This indicates that the IPOs followed by analysts change from showing 
lower returns in years 2 and 3 before 1991 to showing higher returns in years 2 and 3 in the years following 1990.  
To determine if the post 1990 increasing wealth relatives are significantly different from the pre 1991 decreasing 
wealth relatives a Fisher Exact Probability test is performed (Siegel, 1956, pp. 96-104.)  This test shows that the 
change in wealth relatives from year 1 to year 2, before 1990, are significantly different from the change in wealth 
relative form year 1 to year 2, after 1991, at a .05 significance level.  This is also true for the changes in wealth 
relatives from year 1 to year 3.  The same tests are performed for the firms not followed by IBES and no statistically 
significant differences are found. 
  This suggests that analysts appear to be learning and changing their behavior.  They have been better able to 
select IPOs that will perform well over two to three years since 1991 than before 1991. This is even more striking 
given that the percentage of IPOs followed by the analysts has increased dramatically during the last several years.  
Before 1991 the average number of IPOs followed per year was 82 which represented 30% of all IPOs.  After 1991 
the average number of IPOs followed per year was 265 which represented 68% of all IPOs. 
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Table 6: Aftermarket Performance by Year: IBES vs. Non-IBES 
 
Panel A - IPO's Appearing on IBES Withing 1 Year of Their Offer Date 
 Total No. of IBES   End of Year 1 End of Year 2 End of Year 3 
 No. of IBES as % Day 1 Wealth No. Still Wealth No. Still Wealth No. Still
Yr IPOs IPOs of total Return Relative Trading Relative trading Relative Trading
81 312 25 8 0.05 1.12 25 1.41 24 0.87 24 
82 95 25 26 0.14 1.06 25 0.65 25 0.63 21 
83 603 159 26 0.11 0.78 157 0.69 147 0.75 130 
84 280 54 19 0.03 1.25 53 1.09 49 0.92 42 
85 206 63 31 0.07 1.03 62 0.93 58 1.00 51 
86 422 173 41 0.07 1.14 171 1.17 157 1.27 139 
87 339 110 32 0.06 1.03 103 1.00 93 1.21 84 
88 184 74 40 0.06 1.10 73 1.08 70 0.66 66 
89 157 75 48 0.08 1.18 75 0.87 74 0.44 70 
90 136 63 46 0.12 0.99 63 0.89 60 0.88 59 
91 190 117 62 0.13 1.03 117 1.08 115 1.24 107 
92 269 187 70 0.13 0.97 186 1.00 178 1.15 150 
93 389 241 62 0.14 1.01 238 1.13 220 1.18 210 
94 310 193 62 0.11 1.33 192 1.35 179 NA NA 
95 467 348 75 0.21 1.14 342 NA NA NA NA 
96 720 506 70 0.17 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
           
Panel B - IPO's Not Appearing on IBES Withing 1 Year of Their Offer Date 
 Total Non - Non  End of Year 1 End of Year 2 End of Year 3 
 No. of IBES as % Day 1 Wealth No. Still Wealth No. Still Wealth No. Still
Yr IPOs IPOs of total Return Relative Trading Relative trading Relative Trading
81 312 287 92 0.10 0.71 275 0.74 253 0.52 229 
82 95 70 73 0.16 1.03 67 0.63 61 0.56 52 
83 603 444 74 0.13 0.89 434 0.92 392 1.04 337 
84 280 226 81 0.10 1.04 218 0.96 190 0.79 158 
85 206 143 69 0.09 0.89 138 0.76 120 0.71 101 
86 422 249 59 0.08 0.89 243 0.78 219 0.91 182 
87 339 229 67 0.08 0.86 219 0.78 187 0.76 165 
88 184 110 60 0.05 0.91 105 0.83 95 0.42 86 
89 157 82 52 0.07 0.87 80 0.70 77 0.56 67 
90 136 73 54 0.07 0.80 72 0.57 70 0.45 63 
91 190 73 38 0.14 0.69 73 0.71 71 0.44 61 
92 269 82 30 0.11 0.71 81 0.41 77 0.35 66 
93 389 148 38 0.08 0.79 147 0.80 130 0.95 118 
94 310 117 38 0.09 0.94 115 1.02 108 NA NA 
95 467 119 25 0.18 0.85 118 NA NA NA NA 
96 720 214 30 0.16 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
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CONCLUSION 
The initial one-day performance of IPOs has historically been high.  In our sample from 1975-1996 it averages 
13% which is consistent with pervious research.  The performance after this initial price increase has been 
historically poor.  We find that IPOs underperform a control group in the first three years following the initial return.  
Again, this is consistent with previous research. 
We examine the performance of IPOs over time and determine that investors have not changed their behavior.  
This is true even after many years of evidence that IPOs underperform the market in the years following the offering.  
Investors continue to bid up prices of new stock issues and then are subjected to poor performance in the subsequent 
years. 
We also examine IPOs that are followed by analysts.  Analysts have proven to be able to select IPOs that 
perform much better in year one than those they do not follow.  The fact that an analyst is following a company 
seems to help its initial performance.  In the second and third years following the offering, before 1991, however, the 
IPOs followed by the analysts did not performed better than those they did not follow.  In contrast, beginning in 
1991, the firms followed by analysts have continually improved in the second and third years following the offering.  
The analysts appear to be changing their behavior and improving their performance over time.  This indicates that 
analysts may be “learning”. 
 
ENDNOTES 
1 Of the 1,526 fims in Ritter’s sample, only 1,524 were found on the NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ daily tape. 
2 It is during this period that the most dramatic annual change in the number offers occurs:  in 1981, 312 IPOs were 
marketed, followed by only 96 in 1982 (a 69.2% drop).  This was followed in 1983 by a total of 603 IPOs (a 528.1% 
increase.)  The following year, 1984, only 280 IPOs were offered, representing a drop of 53.6% from 1983. 
3 SIC codes were listed in a field in the data set provided by Jay Ritter and are available in the Securities Data Corp 
database.  For the few firms with missing SIC codes, the first available CRSP designated SIC code for that firm was 
used. 
4 Results using the value-weighted index are reported.  The results for the equal-weighted index are not reported but 
are essentially identical. 
5 In their paper, Loughran and Ritter (1995) provide two reasons why they do not match by industry.  They first 
speculate that if firms time initial public offerings to benefit from industry-wide misvaluations, “controlling for 
industry effects will reduce the ability to identify abnormal performance.”  Their second argument is one largely of 
data constraints:  there are too few potential sized-matched firms meeting the equity issuing constraints the authors 
establish within a particular industry.  Consequently, one firm might serve as the control for a number of sample 
firms. 
6 The statistical tests performed in this paper are nonparametric.  Many attributes of out data are not normally 
distributed (i.e. the skewness of the offering size in Table 1 among others) and would violate some of the normality 
assumptions in parametric tests.  Frequently the power of nonparametric tests is lower than tests that assume 
normality and, therefore, lead to conservative conclusions.  Nonparametric tests have a long history of use in 
Accounting (i.e. (Foster, 1977) and (Lorek, 1979) among others) and Finance (i.e. Corrado, 1989) among others.)  
Two well known books on nonparametric statistics are (Siegel, 1956) and (Hollander and Wolfe, 1973.) 
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